The extraction of resources from celestial bodies, commonly known as space mining, is now considered one of the most innovative and, at the same time, controversial frontiers of international space law. The growing interest from private operators and policymakers has made it essential to conduct a thorough and systematic analysis not only of hard law instruments, such as treaties and international conventions, but also of the most recent soft law initiatives and emerging national regulations. This contribution aims to provide an updated and independent overview of the regulatory framework, highlighting the main challenges and perspectives for multi-level governance, with particular focus on the latest developments.

An evolving ban: from article II OST to the need for operational rules

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST)¹, ratified by over 110 states, constitutes the cornerstone of international space law. Article II of the OST explicitly prohibits the national appropriation of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, by states, either through claims of sovereignty or by use, occupation, or any other means. However, the treaty does not explicitly address the legal fate of extracted resources (in-situ resources), leaving room for divergent interpretations and creating a regulatory gap that has led to the adoption of heterogeneous national regulations.

In the United States, the federal law known as the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015² grants U.S. citizens and businesses the right to own, use, sell, and transport space resources extracted from celestial bodies, provided these activities are carried out in compliance with the international obligations assumed by the United States. While reaffirming formal adherence to the non-appropriation principle, the U.S. legislature effectively introduces a proprietary regime for space resources, without claiming any sovereignty over the celestial body itself (cf. 51 USC § 51303).

Luxembourg, on the other hand, has enacted one of the most advanced legislations in Europe on space mining, with the law of July 20, 2017³, which declares space resources „susceptible of appropriation“ upon ministerial authorization, subject to strict requirements regarding financial solidity, governance, risk management, and corporate transparency (Articles 6-10). The system also provides for both ex ante and ongoing controls, as well as full liability for the operator in case of damage caused by the mission.

In the United Arab Emirates, Federal Law No. 12/2019 establishes a licensing regime for the exploration and use of space resources, promoting public-private collaboration and imposing stringent due diligence, transparency, and insurance coverage obligations.

These approaches, while not formally violating Article II of the OST as they are limited to mobile resources and not to the celestial body itself, risk generating regulatory fragmentation and phenomena of forum shopping, leading to potential tensions between states and significant impacts on space object registration procedures (Article VIII OST and the 1976 Registration Convention⁴), as well as on the allocation of liability in case of damage (1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects⁵).

The (partial) failure of the Moon Agreement and the rebirth of soft law

The 1979 Moon Agreement⁶, which qualifies lunar resources as the „common heritage of mankind“ and conditions their exploitation on the establishment of a future international regime (Article 11), has seen limited adoption, being ratified by only eighteen states and not including any of the major spacefaring powers. As a result, it lacks effective enforceability. In the absence of a binding framework, three main strands of soft law have emerged within the international community.

Firstly, the UNCOPUOS guidelines and the reports of the Working Group on Legal Aspects of Space Resource Activities (2023-2025), developed within the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) and the Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), promote principles of transparency, international consultation, prior notification of activities, and mechanisms for progressive benefit-sharing. However, these instruments⁷ lack binding force and rely solely on the voluntary participation of states.

Secondly, the Artemis Accords⁸, launched by NASA in 2020 and signed by over thirty-five countries, establish shared principles regarding transparency, interoperability, activity registration, and the establishment of „safety zones.“ However, these accords leave unresolved the issues of benefit redistribution and multilateral governance of resources. Finally, increasing attention to debris mitigation, planetary protection, and ESG due diligence is reflected in the adoption of technical standards, such as ISO 24113:2021 for space debris mitigation, and industry guidelines, which are becoming increasingly important for securing funding and insurance coverage.

The proliferation of these voluntary regimes, however, risks generating interpretative conflicts and significant legal uncertainty, particularly regarding the legitimacy of the so-called „exclusive usage rights“ (quasi-property rights) unilaterally granted by states.

Perspectives of a „variable geometry“ multilateral regime

In light of the profound regulatory divergences and the growing heterogeneity of national approaches, scholars⁹ have proposed the establishment of a multilateral regime inspired by Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Such a model would include:

• The establishment of an International Space Resource Authority, endowed with licensing, monitoring, and enforcement powers;
• Mechanisms for benefit-sharing and technology transfer to developing countries, to prevent new forms of exclusion or „space colonialism“;
• The creation of a specialized arbitration tribunal for resolving disputes between states and private operators.

However, the lack of international consensus and political resistance—particularly from states that have already adopted competitive national legislation—hinders the implementation of such a regime. In this context, the European Union, despite not having exclusive competence over space mining, could play the role of a regulatory influencer. A common EU-ESA position, integrated into Regulation (EU) 2021/696 establishing the Union’s Space Program¹⁰, could indeed set minimum standards for sustainability, transparency, and due diligence for European operators, with the ambition of extending these rules internationally.

Technical aspects and liability: from risk allocation to insurance coverage

Extraction missions will require the use of in-situ robotic platforms, cislunar transportation infrastructure, and advanced monitoring systems, presenting high technical, operational, and legal risks. These risks are receiving increasing attention from space agencies such as ESA and NASA, as well as from insurance companies and institutional investors:

Regarding debris and collisions, the exponential increase in payloads and satellites destined for lunar and cislunar orbits makes the integration of Space Traffic Management (STM) requirements essential in authorization processes.

U.S. regulations (Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Title IV) and the latest NASA-MITRE reports emphasize the need for shared standards to mitigate collision risks and manage debris, also from the perspective of international liability. In terms of planetary contamination, the COSPAR Guidelines and UNCOPUOS recommendations impose particularly stringent limits on activities that could compromise the scientific or environmental integrity of celestial bodies. These standards can be incorporated as binding conditions in national licenses, in line with Articles VI-IX of the OST, and are increasingly demanded by investors and insurance companies.

With respect to insurance and liability, risk allocation must necessarily account for the strict liability set forth in Article VII of the OST for damage caused by space objects on Earth or in space, as well as the reciprocal waivers of claims stipulated in launch contracts (cf. § 107 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act).

Looking ahead, it may be appropriate to extend state compensation regimes and mandatory insurance coverage, particularly for small operators and startups initiating extraction activities from a state’s territory.

Economic and financing considerations

The business case for space mining is currently highly speculative, as the technological challenges—such as the development of in-situ resource utilization technologies, interplanetary transportation, and refining in hostile environments—combined with high costs and persistent regulatory uncertainties, negatively affect the bankability of projects and the expected value of cash flows.

Despite this, there are signs of increasing interest.

According to the latest market data for 2025, venture capital investments in prospecting technologies, lunar robotics, and ISRU systems have exceeded three billion dollars, with participation from sovereign wealth funds from the Gulf, space agencies like ESA and NASA, and numerous public-private partnerships. Furthermore, sustainable finance and major institutional investors are beginning to preliminarily require Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIA), which can be integrated into national licensing processes and are now a prerequisite for access to capital and insurance coverage. Off-take agreements with the chemical, energy, and aerospace industries—such as for the supply of oxygen and hydrogen to be used as lunar propellants—represent the primary leverage for enhancing bankability and reducing commercial risk.

Looking ahead, the creation of a clear and harmonized regulatory framework, both at the international and national levels, will be crucial for attracting investment and fostering the growth of a sustainable and inclusive space economy.

The race for space resources presents international law with a crucial crossroads: on one hand, the centrality of the non-appropriation principle established by the OST must be preserved, avoiding the transformation of space into a new area of unregulated extractive competition without shared rules and benefit-sharing mechanisms; on the other hand, it is essential to ensure legal certainty, investment protection, and fair access conditions for operators—key elements needed to finance high-risk missions and encourage technological innovation.

The most realistic solution seems to lie in the adoption of a multilevel regime, based on „open“ intergovernmental agreements (modeled after the Artemis Accords), accompanied by minimum international standards and shared best practices, incorporated into national laws through automatic adaptation clauses. Only an inclusive and multilevel approach can truly balance the incentive for innovation with collective responsibility toward „all mankind,“ as envisioned by the OST, ensuring that space remains a common domain and does not become a new frontier for law shopping and geopolitical conflicts.

For further insights into the international space legal framework, please refer to the article published in May 2025: „The International Legal Framework of Space“ (LEXIA, May 2025) >

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1. The full text of the OST is available at the following link: https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty.html ↩︎
2. Public Law 114–90, Titolo IV, „Space Resource Exploration and Utilization Act of 2015“, the text of which is available at https://www.congress.gov/114/plaws/publ90/PLAW-114publ90.pdf ↩︎
3. The full text is available at https://legilux.public.lu/eli/etat/leg/loi/2017/07/20/a674/jo ↩︎
4.  https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/registration-convention.html ↩︎
5. https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/liability-convention.html ↩︎
6. text available at https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/moon-agreement.html ↩︎
7. The reports and guidelines are available at  https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/lsc/space-resources/index.html ↩︎
8. Text available at  https://www.nasa.gov/specials/artemis-accords/index.html ↩︎
9. Among them, particular mention should be made of the contributions by P. Stubbe („Developing a Global Order for Space Resources – A Regime Evolution Approach“, Georgetown Journal of International Law, Vol.  51, 2020, pp. 315–364) and of Yannick Radi („Space Mining in Practice: An International Space Law Perspective on Upcoming Challenges“, ESIL, 2024).
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10. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32021R0696 ↩︎