In a context marked by the growing presence of private operators and regulatory tensions between States, space law faces the urgent need to update its legal framework, which remains rooted in multilateral principles dating back to the 1960s and 1970s.
This contribution provides a systematic overview of the current international legal framework, highlighting key critical issues and prospects for reform.
General introduction and regulatory framework
Although space activities have gained increasing importance over recent decades, both from a technological and economic standpoint, the relevant legal framework remains, to this day, heavily rooted in principles and international conventions developed in a historical and geopolitical context that differs significantly from the current one. The fundamental legal corpus governing the exploration and use of outer space – commonly referred to as “space law” – is primarily based on five multilateral treaties developed under the auspices of the United Nations between 1967 and 1979, the first and most significant of which is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST).
This treaty – ratified by over 110 States, including Italy – sets out a series of general principles meant to govern State activities in space. Among the most notable are the prohibition of national appropriation of the Moon and other celestial bodies (Art. II OST), the obligation to use space exclusively for peaceful purposes (Art. IV), international responsibility for space activities conducted by both public and private actors (Art. VI), and the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance among States (Art. IX).
While these principles represented a major step forward in building a multilateral legal regime for space at the time they were drafted, their current application is being tested by the growing involvement of transnational private actors, the commercial exploitation of extraterrestrial resources, and the increasing militarization of Earth orbits.
In this context, international law (hard law) is often supplemented – or at times replaced – by soft law instruments developed by the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), as well as by non-binding guidelines adopted by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). However, these tools often fail to fill interpretative gaps that have emerged, for example, regarding the concept of peaceful use, the definition of a space object, or the criteria for the allocation of liability for damages.
Actors, liability, and jurisdiction in space law
Another central aspect of the architecture of space law concerns the allocation of responsibilities among States and the definition of jurisdiction over so-called “space objects”. The Outer Space Treaty states that nations are internationally liable for space activities conducted either directly through government agencies or indirectly through private actors authorized to operate under their jurisdiction (Art. VI OST). This is based on a concept of “derived” responsibility, whereby the authorization and continuing supervision of non-State actors is not merely a procedural burden but a substantial legal obligation for the launching or registering State.
Moreover, Article VII OST establishes that the responsible State is liable for damage caused by its space object to another State Party, individuals (natural or legal persons), or their property, either on the Earth’s surface or in outer space. This provision is further detailed in the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Liability Convention), which establishes a system of strict liability for damage occurring on Earth or to aircraft in flight, and fault-based liability for damage occurring in outer space.
A particularly delicate issue is the allocation of jurisdiction and control over space objects, which – under Article VIII OST – remains with the State that registered the space vehicle in the appropriate national registry and with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. While this principle allows States to retain sovereignty over technological assets located in an extraterritorial context, it raises complex interpretative issues in cases involving jointly launched objects, post-explosion fragmentation, or decay of orbital structures.
In the absence of a dedicated space court or institutional arbitration mechanism, such disputes are – as far as possible – handled through diplomatic channels or via ad hoc procedures established in the UN treaties.
The legal regime of celestial bodies: between non-appropriation and common heritage of mankind
The non-appropriation principle, enshrined in Article II OST, is one of the cornerstones of international space law. This provision states that outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, use, occupation, or any other means. The objective is to preserve space as the province of all humankind, for peaceful purposes and the shared benefit of all countries.
However, the interpretation and practical application of this principle have sparked considerable debate, especially with the emergence of private space activities and the increasing interest in the exploitation of extraterrestrial resources. In this regard, the 1979 Moon Agreement attempted to deepen and clarify the legal regime applicable to the Moon and other celestial bodies. Article 11 of the Agreement declares that the Moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind, and that an international regime should be established to govern their exploitation.
The Moon Agreement’s aim to provide a more detailed regulatory framework has faced limited international acceptance; notably, major space powers such as the United States, Russia, and China have not ratified the treaty, thereby limiting its effectiveness and applicability.
In parallel, some States have enacted national legislation to regulate the exploitation of space resources. A prominent example is the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act (2015), which recognizes the right of U.S. citizens to own resources extracted from celestial bodies, while refraining from claiming sovereignty over them. Similarly, Luxembourg adopted the Law of 20 July 2017 on the exploration and use of space resources, explicitly allowing private companies to hold rights over extracted resources (Art. 1(1)), declaring such resources “subject to appropriation,” provided this complies with applicable international law.
These initiatives raise serious concerns regarding compatibility with the non-appropriation principle and the risk of an unregulated “space race” for resources.
To reconcile the desire for resource exploitation with the need to preserve space as the common heritage of mankind, many advocate for the adoption of an international regime inspired by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This would involve the creation of an international authority tasked with regulating space resource extraction, ensuring equitable benefit-sharing and sustainability, similar to the regime governing the deep seabed.
Private actors and commercial activities in space
The growing presence of private actors (such as SpaceX and Blue Origin) in the space sector – a structural trend that is expected to accelerate with the expansion of the new space economy – raises a series of complex and still unresolved regulatory issues. Although the OST formally recognizes, under Article VI, the possibility for non-governmental entities to conduct space activities, it makes such activities contingent on two requirements: prior authorization and ongoing supervision by the relevant State Party.
As a result, under international law, any private space activity is attributable to the relevant national State, which bears primary liability for any violations or damages caused by such operators.
However, the increasing complexity of space operations – often carried out by transnational consortia, using launch vehicles and payloads registered in different countries or located in non-geostationary orbits – has challenged the ability of individual legal systems to exercise effective and coordinated oversight. This has led, on one hand, to the adoption of more permissive national laws aimed at attracting investments and corporate headquarters; on the other hand, to the emergence of divergent State practices, with significant implications for fairness and legal certainty.
A prime example is the aforementioned U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, which, while formally reaffirming the non-appropriation principle, grants U.S. citizens and businesses the right to own, use, and transfer resources obtained from celestial bodies.
Such developments raise fundamental questions about the compatibility between national regulations and international obligations, particularly when national laws are based on broad (if not evasive) interpretations of treaty provisions. The evident risk is a “regulatory balkanization” of outer space, in which States compete to offer the most favorable regulatory regimes, undermining the uniformity and effectiveness of multilateral legal principles.
In the absence of an updated international legal framework with binding and universally accepted enforcement mechanisms, the role of soft law (UNCOPUOS guidelines, UNOOSA recommendations, ISO standards) and inter-State cooperation remains central for establishing best practices and shared mechanisms for authorization, supervision, and liability.
Looking ahead, the development of a supranational regulatory framework is more urgent than ever—one that, while respecting national prerogatives, ensures a minimum level of legal harmonization and compliance for private space activities. This is essential to preserving the long-term sustainability of space and preventing it from becoming a new arena of geopolitical friction and legal deregulation.
